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Abstract 
The role of new media in the Arab uprisings and the news of widespread surveillance of digital and mobile media have triggered a 
renewed interest in Arab audiences research, particularly as it pertains to these audiences’ critical abilities and digital media literacy 
competencies. Taken for granted have been Arab youth’s widespread use of social media for activism and political expression and 
their suspicion of government monitoring and privacy threats. This study questions these assumptions and attempts to provide a more 
accurate picture Arab youth’s media uses, with the goal of informing the development of digital and media literacy curricula for the 
region. The study surveyed 2,554 youth and compared their media uses across countries, genders, incomes, ages, and education levels. 
The findings suggest low media literacy levels and media uses apathetic to political activism and focused more on entertainment with 
little fear of government surveillance and privacy risks 
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The nascent field of media literacy in 
Lebanon and the Arab world continues to be 
hindered by several obstacles, the most daunting of 
which is the lack of local research and case studies 
on which to base curricular material (Melki 2014). 
One relevant area of research that specially remains 
lacking is the media uses of youth in the Arab 
region. It is difficult to build relevant curricula in the 
absence of periodic media uses studies, such as those 
produced regularly in the US by the Kaiser Family 
Foundation (2010), the Center for Digital Future 
(2009), and the Pew Internet & American Life 
Project (2009). Data from such institutions can help 
academics refocus and reorient media literacy 
curricula, emphasizing the media, methods, content, 
and issues that are more relevant to the media 
consumption and production habits of students and 
youth, in general. Therefore, this study attempts to 
fill this gap by studying Arab youth’s mainstream 
and digital media uses and examining claims and 
assumptions of media habits that tend to exaggerate 
the use of digital media for political activism. 
The Arab world’s media landscapes 
experienced fundamental shifts since the mid 1990s 
due to developments in satellite TV, mobile 
telephony, and the Internet (Kraidy 2002; Rinnawi 
2011), a new approach to news, such as that 
pioneered by al–Jazeera (Ayish 2011), and a restive 
young generation—known as the Arab youth 
bulge—yearning for economic and political 
empowerment (Chaaban 2009). More recently, social 
and mobile media offered formerly disenfranchised 
individuals profound resources that added bolder 
voices to the ever more complex and growing Arab 
public spheres (Etling et al. 2010; Hofheinz 2005). 
These same new media have been credited with 
advancing and intensify the Arab uprisings 
(Ghannam 2011).  
However, the role social and digital media 
played in the Arab uprisings remains a controversial 
and understudied topic (Cottle 2011). One extreme 
argues social media was inconsequential (Morozov 
2011), while another goes as far as calling it a 
Facebook revolution (Huang 2011). Both extremes 
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and most arguments in between offer little empirical 
evidence to support their claims, despite intense 
interest in the democratizing role of new media 
(Pintak 2011), the multifaceted and “ongoing battle 
over… the “hearts and minds” of Arabs” (Kraidy 
2002, 91), and the dire predictions of ruptures in the 
Arab youth bulge (Chaaban 2009). Overall, the study 
of Arab media audiences continues to suffer from a 
dearth of reliable empirical research (Amin 2008), 
especially research on social media uses that 
preceded the uprisings (Ghannam 2011). Amin 
(2008) related this problem to a long history of state 
obstruction and “resistance presented by government 
bureaucrats and officials who maintain a proprietary, 
even paranoid, attitude toward information,” 
particularly public opinion surveys for audience 
research, which face “barriers and constraints, from 
inconvenience to imprisonment” (87).  
This study attempts to partially fill this gap 
by analyzing social media uses of youth in Jordan, 
Lebanon, and the UAE at the very dawn of the Arab 
uprisings (2011). It examines social media 
consumption and production habits and compares 
them across countries, genders, age groups, 
educational levels, and income levels. In addition, 
the study evaluates the levels of trust and social and 
political values Arab youth associate with these 
media.  
 Studying media audiences is rooted in the 
uses and gratifications tradition (Blumler & Katz 
1974; McQuail 1994; Rubin 1994). However, the 
ubiquity, mobility, and multiplicity of media tools 
and content today and their potential to empower 
individuals and communities—as well se subject 
them to efficient government surveillance—have 
altered the purpose and scope of studying audiences 
to now encompass new media and to cover “uses and 
gratifications” hardly imagined before, such as 
political empowerment, civic activism, simultaneous 
use of multimedia, and trust in online media sources 
and content. Kraidy (2008) critiqued traditional 
audience research that mainly stemmed from the UG 
paradigm, focused on television, and assumed an 
“audience to be bound up in the nation–state” (92). 
Moreover, the approach has largely ignored the 
expansion of regional Arab media and the Internet. 
Even the term “uses and gratifications” no longer 
seems suitable to describe the complex incessant 
interactive relationship between individuals and 
ubiquitous media messages and tools where various 
overlapping uses of media defy neat categorizations. 
Most individuals today use media constantly 
throughout their waking hours and often use multiple 
media simultaneously for various purposes that often 
overlap. Since non–use of media has become the 
exception for many, it is pertinent to think of this 
human–media relationship as a habit, especially that 
the border between media use and non–use continues 
to blur. In addition, the interaction of various media, 
such as Web 2.0, mobile telephony, and satellite 
services, has extended the purposes of media uses to 
include organizational instruments for local and 
global activism, methods for archiving evidence, 
devices for emergency, and tools for calling for 
action and for work and school work.  
In line with Kraidy’s (2008) concept of 
interactivity, media uses today extend beyond mere 
media consumption and comprise a fair amount of 
production. This complicates the neat division 
between producer and consumer in the UG tradition. 
Consumers are simultaneously producers influenced 
by perceptions of how other consumers/producers 
may use their media productions.  
This has implications on media literacy 
education and curricula. In fact, Kraidy notes, “Arab 
media institutions have in recent years adopted what 
can perhaps be best described as a modified 
encoding–decoding model through which viewers 
are given a sense of agency and where various staged 
‘oppositional’ readings of the media text stand at the 
heart of the new trend in programming” (97). This 
further develops the conception of active audiences 
with choices into empowered interactive audiences 
(Kraidy 2008) who simultaneously contest and 
compose multiple discourses embedded within 
specific complex cultural arrangements and 
dominant ideologies, where these same “audiences 
‘reproduce’ the social–economic system through 
their own participation in it” (99). In relevance to 
media literacy curricula, this means critical  
writing and reflexivity should occupy the same level 
of importance as critical reading of media texts.    
Moreover, the omnipresence of media 
messages and technologies and their increased 
association with numerous social, physical, and 
mental disorders compel the consideration of the 
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addictive power of this converged media system 
(Lange 2008) and the importance of “more 
successful designs for media literacy interventions 
that can avoid boomerang effects and achieve more 
positive goals that will not only help people avoid 
the negative effects of media exposures but also 
enhance the positive effects” (Potter 2010, 690). 
Without regressing into an old conception of a 
passive audience, a new media uses/habits 
conception reframes the UG construct to 
acknowledge that gratifications media audiences 
seek generate both intention and habits, both of 
which consequently drive future media uses/habits 
(LaRose 2010). In that vein, habits are initially goal–
directed and actively pursued, but over time become 
automatic forms of behavior. Strong habits further 
weaken individuals’ reasoned process and push them 
further towards the passive side of the spectrum. 
However, audiences can regain control over their 
media uses by exerting cognitive effort, particularly 
through the use of critical media literacy 
competencies.  
Hence, the media uses/habits concept sets a 
dialectic relationship between the agency of an 
(inter)active audience and the dominant structures 
that reproduce themselves through this interactivity 
and by these audiences’ media habits. So, this study 
goes beyond the commonly used conceptions of 
gratifications to include political activism and 
empowerment, and beyond the notion of a nation–
based consuming audience to include production 
activities and multiple Arab countries. Consistent 
with Kraidy’s (2008) recommendations, media uses 
cover both news and entertainment, integrate 
multiple media, and compare multiple Arab 
countries and various socio–economic factors in one 
design. Furthermore, in addition to the personal 
utilitarian values individuals associate with media 
uses, this study adds a set of political values to assess 
their relevance to audiences’ perceptions of digital 
media, particularly the social media and blogs 
credited with influencing the Arab uprisings.  
Social Media Use in the Arab World, Pre-
and Post-Uprisings. Studies on Arab media uses, 
particularly social media uses, remain rare and suffer 
numerous methodological problems. Amin (2008) 
offers a general review of studies mainly focusing on 
TV audiences. This section reviews other studies, 
primarily those focusing on the Internet and relevant 
to informing media literacy curricula.  
Continuing a long tradition in studying the 
diffusion of Arab media technology, a number of 
recent audience studies dealt with the impediments 
to the adoption and diffusion of the Internet in the 
Arab world. Warf and Vincent (2007) blamed low 
Internet penetration rates, high cost of Internet 
access and computer ownership, low literacy rates, 
and the lack of Arabic content online as impediments 
to Internet diffusion. The study found cultural factors 
impeded virtual community development, including 
the patriarchal system, restrictive gender roles, and 
the fact that group rights often surpass individual 
ones, which has contributed to conservative circles 
contesting Internet diffusion and the state using such 
contestation for coercive control. The study also 
found government censorship and monitoring to be 
serious barriers to the development of the Internet. 
Consistently, the 2009 Arab Knowledge Report 
confirmed that Internet penetration and the number 
of computers per person in most Arab countries 
stood below the global average. Yet the report noted 
that the growth rate in Arabic content is the highest 
among the top ten Internet languages. It stressed the 
importance of integrating digital and media literacy 
into the education system, as Arab governments have 
put little efforts towards this endeavor. 
In contrast, Rinnawi (2011) emphasized the 
paradox Arab governments face in dealing with the 
Internet, explaining that Arab governments attempt 
to develop and simultaneously restrain the Internet. 
“At the same time that they are aware of its 
importance to their economic development and its 
vitality in attracting foreign investments, they 
perceive it as a factor that affects the political and 
social stability of their countries” (123). 
Hroub (2009) challenged the perspective that 
the only source of control of the Internet in the Arab 
world comes from government and proposed that 
religious authorities offer a second primary form of 
control. Hroub claimed that the Internet’s impact on 
Arab society is over blown and warned against 
overestimation of its potential, as it is largely elitist 
and confined to narrow circles. “With the continuity 
of socio–political authoritarian systems coupled with 
illiteracy rates and technological poverty, the 
J Melki / Journal of Media Literacy Education 6(3), 14 - 29 
 
17 
Internet stays on the margin both as a public sphere 
of freedom and as a venue for political action” (271).  
While the preceding tackled the numerous 
obstacles to Internet adoption, a number of studies 
emphasized the Internet’s potential as a platform for 
democratic reform and political change.  
Emphasizing blogs, Etling et al. (2010) 
mapped the Arab blogosphere and found the Arabic 
networked public sphere clustered nationally and 
focused on local issues. Only few regional topics 
united the network, primarily Palestine. Despite 
predominantly covering personal issues, Arab blogs 
nevertheless contained rich political discussions. In 
addition, more blogging activities occurred in certain 
geographic areas, particularly the Arab East and 
Egypt, in addition to an English bridge group that 
interpreted local events to audiences in the West. It 
found the Arab blogosphere is a “political discourse 
space apparently free of government control” 
exhibiting a mix of top–down and bottom–up agenda 
setting dynamics (1240). This suggests that media 
literacy case studies should focus on local rather than 
regional (Arab) experiences.  
Consistently, Hofheinz (2005) maintained 
that Internet technology has not been able to curtail 
expanding freedoms despite rampant censorship, 
while Lynch (2007) argued that the blogosphere 
represented a new medium for Arab political 
mobilization that could potentially break state 
controlled media by providing the foundations of a 
new Arab public sphere.  
In contrast, Haugbolle (2007) critically 
analyzed the Lebanese blogosphere between 2005 
and 2006, questioning the assumption that the 
introduction of free media automatically contributes 
to the development of democratic societies. 
Haugbolle noted that by facilitating informal modes 
of communication, blogs do open space for those 
blocked from official and mainstream news 
channels. The study rejected generalizations about 
Lebanese public opinion derived from studying the 
blogosphere, as it remained dominated by the 
educated and economically privileged. 
Consequently, it would be important to understand 
how Arab youth perceive blogs as trustworthy news 
sources.  
More recently, a handful of studies centered 
on online and social media uses. A 2009 survey that 
explored the knowledge, attitudes, and behavior of 
Iraqi youth and adolescents aged 10–30 found that 
one–third of Iraqi youth know how to use computers, 
but only 13 % described their knowledge level as 
“good,” and only 13 % said they had used the 
Internet, with twice as many males as females saying 
so (Iraq National Youth 2009). Among Internet 
users, three-quarters used it for surfing websites, 
while half used it for chatting, an indication that the 
web is mainly a source for entertainment rather than 
news and political activism.  
Focusing on the UAE, Al–Jenaibi (2011) 
used survey and focus group methods to study social 
media uses. The initial findings revealed that 
Facebook, YouTube, and LinkedIn were among the 
most popular social media. Emiratis felt adept at 
using social media, perceived them in a positive 
light, and used them frequently. In addition, 
participants felt confident about social media’s 
abilities to credibly and accurately relay information, 
compared to traditional media.  
In a more comprehensive study of social 
media uses in the Arab world, Mourtada & Salem 
(2010) provided evidence for a rapidly increasingly 
number of Facebook users across the region, with the 
highest penetration rates in the Gulf region and 
Lebanon. Despite lower penetration rates in Egypt, 
the almost five million Facebook users in that 
country made up over one–fifth of the region’s users. 
The study found Facebook to be dominated by male 
and young users. When it came to gender, Lebanon 
and Jordan were among the top four gender–
balanced countries. The UAE came in 10th place. 
Additionally, the study found some Arab countries 
have more Facebook users than Internet users, an 
indication that users access Facebook through 
mobile phones. With few exceptions, Facebook 
usage positively correlated with a host of economic 
and development indexes, including GDP per capita, 
Internet penetration rate, Human Development 
Index, and Digital Access Index. The exceptions, 
such as Saudi Arabia, the study contends, may be 
related to social and cultural norms and sensitivities. 
Finally, Internet freedom in each Arab country did 
not correlate with Facebook usage.  
In an ambitious study to map media uses in 
the Arab region, Dennis, Martin, and Wood (2013) 
surveyed audiences in eight Arab countries. They 
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found that Television remains the top medium for 
news and entertainment across the region, while the 
Internet continues to occupy a larger space, 
especially in the Gulf countries that are better wired. 
Similarly, the use of the Internet, social media, and 
mobile technologies, while widely spread across the 
region, tended to be higher in countries with better 
IT infrastructures. The study also found a wide 
generation gap but a smaller gender gap for Internet 
use, and it concluded that Arabic is the main 
language used to access media, followed closely by 
English, but the latter lead in some countries when it 
came to accessing the web. In addition, most 
participants supported freedom of expression online, 
but paradoxically also supported more regulations 
for the Internet. Moreover, the majority had positive 
views about the Internet as a source for information, 
but only about half the participants saw that the 
Internet helped strengthen their political influence 
and gave them a stronger say in government policies.  
In sum, the majority of these studies tended 
to focus on impediments to the adoption and 
diffusion of the Internet while others examined the 
potential of the Internet, especially the blogosphere, 
as potential for political reform. Even studies that 
tackled media uses directly tended to focus on 
limited media, examined general levels of internet 
use in different Arab countries as compared to their 
development indexes, and studied basic attitudes 
towards internet regulations and benefits. Therefore, 
this is frames media uses of Arab youth within media 
literacy with the aim of better informing digital and 
media literacy curricula and teaching. It surveys 
various digital and social media uses of Arab youth 
by answering the following questions and comparing 
them across countries, genders, age groups, 
education levels, and income levels: 
 
RQ1. What characterizes uses of social media 
and blogs?  
RQ2. How are online and social media perceived 
as news sources? 
RQ3. How are online and social media perceived 
as entertainment tools? 
RQ4. What characterizes attitudes toward 
Internet restrictions and the trustworthiness of 
online content? 
RQ5. What characterizes attitudes toward the 
Internet in general? 
 
Methodology 
 
This study used a cross–sectional survey 
methodology. It used a self–administered survey 
approach for efficiency and to avoid interviewer bias 
and maximize respondent privacy. 
The study surveyed 2,744 high school and 
university students in Jordan, 1  Lebanon,2 and the 
UAE, 3 using a cluster sampling technique. In cluster 
sampling, researchers draw groups rather than 
individuals, which improves the response rate and 
allows for efficient surveying. A cluster was defined 
as a high school or university classroom. 
Researchers categorized the schools and universities 
in the three countries according to tuition level 
(lower–, middle–, upper–income), location (urban, 
rural), gender, (male–only, female–only, mixed), 
orientation (religious/missionary, secular), language 
(Arabic/English, Arabic/French, Other), and 
ownership (public/private). At least two schools 
from each category in each country where contacted. 
Most attempts to get access to public, lower–income, 
and rural schools failed. This skewed the sample in 
favor of urban middle–to–upper–income private 
schools and universities. From the final list of 43 
schools and universities, researchers selected 
purposively two to four classes, taking into 
consideration gender, age, and language diversity.  
Jordan, Lebanon and the UAE were selected 
mainly for pragmatic reasons—given the easy access 
to schools and universities without the need of 
official government permission—and because they 
offer relatively high literacy rates (90% and higher, 
according to the World Factbook), as well as a large 
number of schools and universities.  
Although 2,744 filled the paper 
questionnaires, only 2,477 were deemed valid for 
use. The (un–weighted) demographics of the final 
sample ended up as follows: Most participants came 
                                       
1 Sample size: 874 (459 from universities and 415 from 
schools). 
2 Sample size: 1109 (352 from universities and 757 from 
schools).  
3 Sample size: 761 (135 from universities and 626 from 
schools).   
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from Lebanon (48 %), followed by the UAE (28 %) 
and Jordan (24 %). Most participants were female 
(56 %). All participants were aged 13 to 28, with 79 
% of them between 16 and 21. Most (63 %) were 
still in school. Most came from high schools that 
taught Arabic and English (62 %), followed those 
that taught Arabic, English, and French (19 %). 
Similarly, the vast majority said they fluently spoke 
Arabic (88 %), followed by English (70 %) and 
French (15 %). The vast (84 %) were not employed, 
and most (63 %) claimed an income or allowance of 
$250 or less per month.  
Although the sample was skewed in favor of 
urban middle–to–upper–income private schools and 
universities, it nevertheless represented much of the 
youth demographics of the three countries. The vast 
majority of inhabitants in Jordan (78 %), Lebanon 
(87 %), and the UAE (78 %) live in cities. The three 
countries have relatively high literacy rates (96, 90, 
and 90 %, respectively) and high school–life 
expectancy (13, 13, and 11 years, respectively) 
(World Factbook n.d.).  
The questionnaire comprised 59 close–ended 
questions and one open–ended question and required 
15 minutes to complete. The questionnaire was 
grounded in published academic and commercial 
studies (e.g., Pew Internet 2009; Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2007), and took into consideration local 
cultures. The questionnaire was pretested and 
translated into Arabic, and reverse–translated into 
English to ensure translation reliability.  
All uses and attitudinal questions used a 
four–point ordered response scale measured at the 
ordinal level, while some frequency–of–use 
questions for specific periods used a seven–point 
ordered response scale, measured at the ordinal level.  
Because of the sample skew, the researchers 
implemented a data weighting procedure, using 
SPSS, giving a 1.5 weight coefficient to “lower to 
middle income” participants, and a 0.5 weight 
coefficient to middle to upper income participants. 
The weighted dataset was analyzed using frequency 
tables, cross–tabulations, and correlation tests. A 
chi–squared significance level of p ≤ 0.05 and a 5% 
difference between compared variables was 
considered significant.  
The independent variables used for 
comparison were: country of residence, gender, age 
group, education level, and income level. For 
simplicity, age groups, education levels and income 
levels each included only two groups: 18–28 years 
old versus 17 or younger, those with a high school 
degree or higher versus those with some high school 
education or less, those of middle–to–upper income 
versus those of lower–to–mid income, respectively.  
Surveying in the Arab world comes with its own 
difficulties, and using cluster sampling has some 
significant limitations.  First, the researchers faced 
difficulties in securing permission from the selected 
universities and students. These difficulties varied 
from non-responsiveness and rejection to participate, 
to refusal to allow certain questions, especially those 
relating to religion, in the survey questionnaire.  
Some of these difficulties contributed to skewing the 
study sample.  In addition, the sampling used did not 
allow for statistical generalization.  However, the 
researchers made sure to include a diverse and 
mostly representative sample of the population under 
study.  Finally, survey methodology does not allow 
for the rich information that can be gathered through 
qualitative methods, such as depth interviews or 
focus groups.  
 
Results 
 
Organized by research question, this section 
starts with general results for each research question 
then compares the variables across the countries, 
genders, age groups, education levels, and income 
levels.  
Uses of Social Media and Blogs. Participants 
were asked how often and for what purposes they 
use social media and blogs, and what languages they 
use to write blogs.  
The vast majority (87%) said they had used 
social media, with no significant differences 
appearing between the compared groups. Among 
those who had used social media, 84% used it 
mainly for fun, 84% to connect with existing friends, 
58% to connect with family, 55% to make new 
friends, and 41% to express their opinions. Only 9% 
used social media to conduct business, and 5% used 
it for political activism. 
 Some differences emerged between 
countries, genders, and income levels. First, 
Lebanese and Jordanians were more likely than 
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Emiratis to use social media for political activism, 
while Jordanians were more likely than Emiratis and 
Lebanese to use it for expressing their opinions. 
Second, males were more likely than females to use 
social media for making new friends. Similarly, 
lower income participants were more likely than 
higher income participants to use social media to 
make new friends.  
In contrast with their social media uses, few 
participants (23%) said they had ever written blogs, 
and only 10% blogged at least once a day. When 
comparing groups, males tended to blog more 
frequently than females, but no other differences 
registered.  
Among those who blogged, 68 % wrote 
about music/entertainment news, followed by 
arts/culture (37%), sports (33%), travel (25%), 
science/technology (23%), international news (20%), 
health (18%), and religion (17%). Local politics 
garnered 15%, followed by Arab political news 
(14%) and economic/financial news (11%).  
Lebanese subjects blogged most frequently 
about local politics and least frequently about 
religion. Jordanians blogged the most about 
music/entertainment and arts/culture, and the least 
about economic/financial news. Emiratis blogged the 
most about international news. Males blogged more 
than females about sports, science/technology, and 
local politics, while females blogged more about 
music/entertainment and arts/culture. As for 
education level, participants of lower education level 
were more likely than those of higher education level 
to blog about music and entertainment and less likely 
to blog about local political news. Older participants 
blogged more than their younger counterparts about 
local politics and less about music/entertainment. 
Finally, higher income participants blogged more 
than lower income participants about international 
news.  
Furthermore, the vast majority of bloggers 
primarily wrote in English (81%). Only 11% used 
Arabic, and 4% used French. In addition, 4% wrote 
in both Arabic and English. When comparing, those 
of higher income used English more often than those 
of lower income, while the latter used Arabic more 
than the former. Lebanese used French the most, 
while Emiratis used English the most. 
Social Media and Blogs as News. 
Participants chose how frequently they used various 
media sources for news. They also responded to 
whether certain values are associated with news 
accessed through blogs and social media.  
The vast majority of surveyed participants 
received most of their news from television and 
word of mouth (friends/family), followed by 
professional websites, online video services, emails, 
SMS, social media, print media 
(newspapers/magazines), radio, and—at the bottom 
of the list—blogs (See Table 1). This section focuses 
on professional web sites, online video services, 
social media, and blogs. 
Professional news websites ranked as the top 
online news source with 59% of participants using 
them at least once a day. Lebanese were slightly less 
likely than Jordanians and Emiratis to use 
professional news websites (at least once a day). In 
addition, older participants, those with higher 
education, and those of higher income used news 
websites more often than their counterparts. 
Online video services ranked second with 
59% using them as news sources at least once a day. 
Here too, Lebanese and Jordanians used this news 
source less than Emiratis. Those of higher income 
also used them more than those of lower income. 
Social media followed with 52% using them as news 
sources at least once a day. The same trend emerged 
between countries with Lebanese using them less 
than Jordanians and Emiratis, and higher income 
participants using them more. Blogs ranked last with 
only 16% using them as news sources at least once a 
day. Jordanians were less likely to use them 
compared to Lebanese and Emiratis. In addition, 
older participants and those of higher education used 
them more often.  
Table 2 reveals some values participants 
associated with news acquired from blogs, social 
media, online video services, and professional news 
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Table 1  
Uses of Various Media as News Sources 
 
 
 
websites. Participants were asked whether they 
describe these news sources as trustworthy, 
untrustworthy, independent, government controlled, 
objective, or biased. A simple index was then 
calculated by subtracting the percentage of 
participants who agreed with each of the three 
opposing pairs. Only professional web sites received 
a positive index value (+11) for trustworthiness, 
suggesting they were perceived as the most 
trustworthy news source compared to the other three.  
 
Table 2 
Values Associated with News from Online Media Sources 
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On, the other hand, blogs received the highest 
negative index (-28), suggesting they were perceived 
as the least trustworthy news source, followed by 
social media (-17), and online videos (-7).  
Social media (+12) and online videos 
services (+12), followed closely by blogs (+9), 
offered a higher positive index for independence. 
This suggests they were perceived as more 
independent than professional websites (+4).  
Finally, the objectivity index suggested that 
professional websites (+12) were perceived as more 
objective than online video services (0), while both 
were perceived as more objective than social media 
(-3) and blogs (-7).  
 
 
Social Media and Blogs as Entertainment 
 
Participants answered questions about the use 
of media for entertainment. They were also asked to 
allocate certain values to social media and blogs.  
Participants spent many hours daily on 
entertainment-related media activities, substantially 
more than what they spent on news. In fact, 55 
percent of participants spent over three hours per day 
using media for entertainment, while only 10 percent 
did the same for news. Watching television, using 
mobile phones, and listening to music ranked as the 
top entertainment-related media activities. Table 3 
focuses on the use of online media tools for 
entertainment.
 
Table 3 
Use of Media for Entertainment and Leisure 
 
 
 
Social media topped the list of entertainment-
related online media activities with 54% using them 
at least once a day. Jordanians used social media for 
entertainment the most, and so did higher income 
participants. Chatting online came in second (47%). 
Lebanese chatted online the most, and so did higher 
income participants. Next came watching videos 
online (44%). Emiratis, males, and higher income 
participants used videos online for entertainment 
more than their counterparts. Talking on 
Skype/VOIP followed (36%). Next came Internet 
games (33%). Emiratis, males, and lower income  
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Table 4 
Values Associated with Social Media and Blogs 
 
 
participants played online games more than their 
counterparts. Finally, reading blogs was the least 
popular entertainment activity, with only 15% saying 
they read blogs for entertainment at least once a day.  
Emiratis and males used this medium for 
entertainment more than their counterparts.  
Participants associated certain values with 
social media and blogs. Their responses were ranked 
for easier interpretation, as shown on Table 4.  
For social media, the top three values participants 
chose were exciting, distracting, and addictive, 
followed by essential, efficient, beneficial, liberating, 
and harmful. The three lowest ranked values were 
boring, educating, and difficult. 
As for blogs, the top three values were 
distracting, boring, and difficult. Then came 
essential, efficient, exciting, liberating, and harmful. 
The lowest three ranking least popular values were 
beneficial, addictive, and educating.  
Attitudes toward Internet Restrictions and 
the Trustworthiness of Online Content. Participants 
responded to attitudinal questions about online 
restrictions, about the trustworthiness of online 
content, and whether they used real names or fake 
profiles online. The purpose of these questions was 
to gage participants’ attitudes toward freedom of 
expression online, their critical awareness of the 
veracity and accuracy of online content, and their 
alertness to online surveillance and privacy threats—
three matters that tie into media literacy 
competencies. 
When asked about their attitudes toward 
Internet restrictions, a slight majority (52%) 
advocated no or fewer restrictions on Internet 
content (21% chose no restrictions), and 48% 
supported more restriction or an Internet ban (8% 
chose ban). Emiratis, males, and lower income 
participants were more likely to choose no/fewer 
restrictions.  
When asked about the trustworthiness of 
online information, 83%described it as somewhat or 
very trustworthy (71% chose somewhat trustworthy). 
Emiratis trusted online content more than Lebanese 
and Jordanians.  
When asked whether they used their real 
name or a fake profile for various online activities, 
the majority said they used real names for all online 
media in question. More specifically, 86% used their 
real names on social media. Lebanese and Jordanians 
were more likely than Emiratis to do so. The same 
applied to those of higher income and higher 
education. 
Similarly, 82% used their real names for 
email, with Jordanians and Lebanese more likely to 
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do so than Emiratis. Again, participants of higher 
income and those of higher education were more 
likely than their counterparts to do so.  
Next, 69% used their real names for chatting 
online, with substantially more Lebanese doing so 
compared to Jordanians and Emiratis. The same 
applied to participants of higher income. 
Finally, 61% used their real names for 
tweeting, and 53% did so for blogging, although 
only few participants blogged or tweeted, with 
differences between categories parallel to the 
preceding media.  
Attitudes toward the Internet. Participants 
responded to attitudinal questions about their 
perceptions of online tools. These questions aims to 
better understand whether participants see the 
Internet as a positive or negative tool for personal 
and political empowerment and whether they are 
aware of online media’s negative aspects, such as 
distraction from work and school and its potential to 
offer surveillance opportunities for government 
institutions. It also aims to assess whether the 
Internet as a medium is perceived as a corruptive 
force—a sentiment that accompanied the 
introduction of almost all new media, especially 
TV—and weather participants appreciate it for its 
potential as a political instrument or more as a mode 
of entertainment.  
Almost all somewhat or strongly agreed that 
the Internet offers great entertainment opportunities 
and helps them with work/schoolwork. A substantial 
majority agreed the Internet helps them express their 
opinions, helps them advocate their causes/beliefs, 
and distracts them from work/schoolwork. A 
substantial minority agreed the Internet poses threats 
to their privacy, helps corrupt them, helps the 
government monitor them, and helps them influence 
government, while one-third agreed the Internet 
helps them gain political power. See Table 5. The 
latter highlights the low ranking of the Internet as a 
political tool in participants’ minds, particularly in 
comparison to the Internet as an entertainment tool. 
When comparing countries, Jordanians and Emiratis 
agreed more than Lebanese that the Internet helps 
them express their opinions, helps them advocate 
their causes, distracts them from work/schoolwork, 
and helps the government monitor them, while more 
Emiratis than Lebanese and Jordanians agreed the 
Internet helps them gain political power. In addition, 
more participants of higher education agreed the 
Internet helps them advocate their causes, poses 
threats to their privacy, helps the government 
monitor them, and helps them influence government. 
 
Table 5 
Attitudes Towards the Internet 
 
 
 
  
More higher income participants agreed the 
Internet distracts them from work, poses threats to 
their privacy, and helps the government monitor 
them, while more lower income participants agreed 
the Internet helps them influence government and 
helps them gain political power. Finally, more males 
agreed the Internet helps corrupt them, helps the 
government monitor them, helps them influence 
government, and helps them gain political power. 
This may suggest a gendered rift in participants’ 
perception of the Internet both as a political tool and 
a medium that offers vast opportunities for 
government surveillance, which are perceptions 
enhanced by more critical awareness of the Internet 
and may also be related to social structures that have 
historically pushed women out of the political 
sphere.  
 
Discussion 
 
This study explored the media uses of youth in three 
Arab countries and assessed the values these youth 
associate with various online media, focusing on the 
uses of social media and blogs within the context of 
media and digital literacy.  
Avid Consumers, Nonprolific Producers, 
and Not so Media Literate Users. The study found 
participants digitally savvy and adept at using digital 
technologies but not necessarily media literate. They 
use social media extensively, but use it more for 
entertainment and networking with family and 
friends rather than for news or political activism, 
which is consistent with other studies (Iraq National 
Youth, 2009). Participants are avid consumers of 
social and digital media but not prolific producers. In 
contrast with extensive use of social media by the 
vast majority of participants, only few write blogs 
regularly, and their blogging activities mainly focus 
on entertainment and soft news. Hard news and local 
and regional news garner less attention. Moreover, 
participants overwhelmingly trust online content. 
Despite widespread fears of privacy threats online, 
most use their real names for all online media. 
However, political culture may taper this trust. 
Emirati participants are the least likely to use their 
real names on all online media, probably due to less 
freedoms and more restrictions in the UAE 
compared to Lebanon and Jordan. In addition, those 
of higher income, those of higher education, and 
older participants are more likely to use their real 
names, an indication that awareness of online threats 
to privacy and other risks—a logical measure of 
digital and media literacy—are not related to 
education, wealth, or maturity that comes with age. 
In addition, the findings show participants prefer 
USA-originated web tools, and they reflect the 
dominance of English among bloggers, especially 
among affluent bloggers and those from the UAE, 
reflecting the country’s sizable English-speaking 
expatriate population (Etling et al. 2010). 
A Risk-Free World of Entertainment, Safe 
from Big Brother, Removed from Activism. Arab 
youth tend to be highly uncritical and unaware of 
social media risks, an indication of low levels of 
critical media literacy and poor knowledge of online 
media threats. Most participants associate the 
Internet with entertainment, personal utility, and 
expression, while they disassociate it from 
government surveillance, privacy threats, personal 
corruption, and political activism. A majority agrees 
that the Internet offers great entertainment 
opportunities, helps with work/schoolwork, helps 
express opinions and advocate causes and beliefs, 
and simultaneously distracts from work/schoolwork. 
On the other hand, a majority disagrees that the 
Internet poses threats to privacy, helps corrupt users, 
helps government monitor users, helps users 
influence government, and helps users gain political 
power. This may have strong implications for Arab 
political activism and the Arab uprisings in general, 
as it seems to support the notion that the new 
opportunities afforded by online media did not play a 
central role in these uprisings or in advancing 
political activism in the region—at least not in these 
three countries.  
Traditional Media Uses Migrate to Social 
Media. Cultural factors that influence offline media 
uses seem to mediate online media uses, which 
suggests that traditional media literacy lessons and 
theories continue to be relevant in the social media 
realm. Cultural factors that influence gender roles 
and gender-based values offline, such as the 
(in)appropriateness of meeting new people in certain 
settings, seem to be replayed in the social media 
realm with females less likely to use social media to 
meet new people. Moreover, similar gender trends 
that exist in traditional media again surface in 
blogging, with more males interested in blogging 
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about sports, technology, and politics, while more 
females interested in entertainment and arts and 
culture. Age, education, and income seem to also 
play a similar role to that in traditional media uses, 
with older participants and those of higher education 
more interested in local politics and less so in music 
and entertainment, and higher income participants 
more interested in international news. 
Traditional Media Still Trump Online 
Media in News and Entertainment. Media literacy 
curricula should not ignore traditional (offline) 
media and non-social online media, as they continue 
to occupy a significant space among Arab youth and 
remain more credible than social media. Television 
and word of mouth remain the top sources of news, 
beating all online and social media in popularity, 
while radio and newspapers trail behind all online 
news sources except blogs. When exclusively 
comparing online news sources, professional news 
websites, and online videos beat social media and 
blogs, assumingly with the former’s high quality 
news product and the latter’s strong audio-visual 
appeal. Consistently with news sources, traditional 
media (TV and listening to music) and mobile 
phones dominate entertainment-related media uses. 
However, unlike online news sources, social media 
rank first for entertainment among online media. 
Reading blogs is the least popular entertainment 
activity and source of news. Validating these 
perceptions are the values participants associate with 
social media and blogs. Many regard social media as 
exciting, easy to use, and addictive, while a majority 
sees blogs as boring and difficult to use. In addition, 
many perceive both social media and blogs as 
distracting and not educating. Finally participants do 
not strongly perceive either as liberating, beneficial, 
or harmful, further supporting an apathetic view of 
social media and blogs when it comes to political 
activism. Moreover, the analysis of values specific to 
news reveals that participants view news from blogs 
and social media as untrustworthy and biased but 
simultaneously independent. In contrast, they regard 
professional news websites as more trustworthy and 
objective but also less independent. Online video 
services offer mixed results, as participants perceive 
them as somewhat untrustworthy and relatively 
independent, but the perception about their 
objectivity is mixed. 
Traditional Obstacles to Internet Diffusion 
Still at Play with Social Media. Media literacy 
curricula should take into consideration IT 
infrastructure, access to Internet, and political culture 
in each Arab country. Technological development, 
interest in events abroad, and diversity and 
prolificacy of the traditional local press may account 
for differences in the social media uses of each 
country (Kraidy 2002). Emiratis, who enjoy the most 
developed Internet infrastructure, but the least 
diverse local press, are more likely than Jordanians 
and Lebanese to use all online and social media for 
news. Technological development seems to also play 
a role in online entertainment. Emiratis use online 
videos, online games, and blogs for entertainment 
more than their Lebanese and Jordanian 
counterparts. Tied to technological development is 
the affordability of Internet services both for news 
and entertainment (Rinnawi 2011). The findings 
show affluent participants more likely to use 
professional web sites, online videos, and social 
media for news and more likely to use social media, 
online forums, and online video services for 
entertainment. Furthermore, the cultural and political 
factors that inhibit Internet diffusion in the Arab 
world (Loch et al. 2003; Warf and Vincent 2007) 
extend to views surrounding Internet restrictions. 
The number of participants who advocate fewer 
restrictions on Internet content is virtually equal to 
that of those who prefer more restrictions. In 
addition, participants from countries that experience 
the most Internet restrictions (UAE then Jordan) tend 
to advocate fewer restrictions more than participants 
from countries that experience few or no restrictions 
(Lebanon). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The study found that surveyed Arab youth are avid 
and adept consumers of online and social media, 
particularly of Western media tools and for 
entertainment purposes, but are not prolific 
producers of online and social media, especially for 
the blogosphere. They tend of overly trust online 
content, which suggests low digital media literacy 
levels. Political activism was low on their priority 
list, as they tend to view social media and blogs as 
tools for entertainment that are largely perceived as 
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safe of government surveillance and privacy risks. 
The same obstacles that inhibit Internet diffusion and 
adoption remain at play with social media and 
blogging uses, especially technological development 
and cultural restrictions. Similarly, media uses that 
dominate traditional media are echoed in the social 
media and blogging spheres, including the 
differences between genders, incomes, ages, and 
education levels. Furthermore, popular traditional 
media, particularly TV, remain more popular than 
online media for both news and entertainment.  
Therefore, the findings suggest a strong need 
for developing and advancing media literacy 
education in the Arab region, as the results indicate 
low critical media literacy rates and little awareness 
of online media threats among Arab youth, despite 
proficiency in using digital technologies but 
primarily for entertainment purposes. In addition, the 
findings indicate that media literacy curricula and 
theories that focus on traditional media remain 
relevant, especially that cultural factors that 
influence offline media uses also apply to online 
media uses, while traditional media continue to 
occupy a significant space among Arab youth and 
remain more credible than social media. Finally, 
media literacy curricula should differentiate between 
Arab countries when it comes to priorities, topics, 
and focuses, taking into consideration each country’s 
IT infrastructure, access to Internet, and political 
culture. Furthermore, given the differences between 
the countries when it came to responses about the 
Internet’s potential for political activism and 
government surveillance threats, it is important to 
emphasize the latter for Lebanese curricula and 
highlight the former for Emirati and Jordanian 
curricula. 
More in-depth research is needed to assess 
the specific media literacy needs and to guide the 
development of curricula, as well as research that 
focuses on critical thinking and analytical skills of 
Arab youth when it comes to consuming and 
producing media messages.  
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